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IN THE 1980s AND 1990s
ABSTRACT
ills paper summarizes important developments in collective bargaining in the
construction industry in the 1980s and 1990s. Workers in the industry have experienced high
unemployment and a 17 percent drop in real wages. Union density has declined from 33 percent
in 1981 to 22 percent in 1992, despite a sizable drop in the union-nonunion differential in wages
and a tremendous reduction in the number of strikes. The main reasons for the decline in union
strength are the adoption of strategies by contractors and owners to control labor costs and
changes in the interpretation of labor laws that have given contractors more flexibility in
determining their collective bargaining status.
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and NBERFirms in the construction industry build and renovate structures. The
industry has four major sectorsi residential, commercial (mostly retail and
office space), industrial, and heavy andhighway.Most Construction is done
by independent contractors who must continuously compete for new projects.
Somearegeneral contractors who bid for an entire project. Somegeneral
contractorshire all employees directly, but the more common practice is to
subcontract most of the work to specialty trade contractors. This means that
the mix of firms and employees working on a project is constantlychanging
fromthe initial stage of ground—clearing until the final touch—up of the
interior.
Constructionwork has a number of unique characteristics that are
reflected in its industrial and work organization.Construction jobs on a
particularsite are of relatively shortduration. .Job instability is
exacerbatedby technological and financial forces. Host of the work is done
outside,so work schedules are often interrupted by the weather. A large
share of construction projects is financed with borrowedmoney, making the
industry extremely sensitive to interest rates andcreditavailability.
Construction work calls for a wide range of skills. Sometasksdone by
laborers require absolutely no training or previous work experience, whereas
muchof the work done by electricians requires years of training. Because
most jobs are short term, employers have no incentives to providetraining
unlessthe costs can be shifted to anotherparty. Most construction skills
alsoare marketable outsidethe industry.
I.INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENTS
Value added from the construction industry directly accounted for S
percent of the nation's output and employment throughout the l980s. The value
of construction projects put in place accounts for 9 percent of national
output.This larger figure reflects the fact that output and employment in
manyother industries ——mostnotably lumber, cement, stone products, metal2
products, and machinery ——isdirectly used as an input in construction.
The industry has gonethrougha bust—boom—bust cycle since 1979.
Inflationsoaredto double—digitlevels in that year, partly because of
increased oil prices. Lenders required higher interest rates to offsetthe
greater losS in purchasing power. Theprimerate rose from 9 percent in 1978
to 13 percent in 1979and15 percent in 1980. To reduce inflation, the
FederalReserve Board pushed interest rates up even further. The prime rate
peaked at 19 percent in 1981 anddeclinedonly modestly to 15 percent in 1982
(modest because inflation had dropped to 4 percent in that year). Other
interestrates, including home mortgages, followed a similar pattern.
Theconsequences of high interest rates for the construction industry
were disastrous. Real QNP in construction dropped by 8.4 percent in 1980,
followed by further declines of 2.0 and 6.2 percentin1981—82. Employment
fell by 2.6 percent in 1980,3.7percent in 1981, and 7.0 percent in 1982.
Unemployment for construction workers is always higher than in other sectors
because of time needed to search for new work in betweenjobs. Itincreased
from 10.1 percent in 1979 (compared to 5.8 percent for allexperienced
workers) to 14.4 percent in 1980 and 20.1 percent in 1982 ——thehighest rate
in any majQr sector of the economy since World War II.
The industry recovered, along with the rest of theeconomy, in the next
four years. Output grew by 3.7 percent in 1983 and 9.1percent in 1984. Host
of the boost in 1984 came from two sectors: residential andcommercial. Later
in the 1980s, state and local construction alsopicked up. Federal
construction stayed level throughout the decade and industrialconstruction
activity etayed below its 1982 level for most of the decade.By 1985
construction employment had risen above its 1979 peak and continuedgrowing
through 1989.
Construction activity fell in both 1990 and 1991 and, at the time this3
was written, output remains below the 1989 level.' Value put in place
declined from an annual rate of $464.4 billion in March 1990 to $394.3 billion
inJune1991. Employment dropped by 1.0 percent in 1990, 9.0 percent in1991,
and1.8 percent in 1992. The unemployment rate for construction workers
jumped upwardin 1991 and 1992 to 15.4 and 17.1 percent.
The biggest decline in construction activity took place in the
commercial sector. This was a consequence of overbuilding that took place in
the l980s, fueled by favorable changes in the taxtreatmentof structures in
1981 (later reversed by the tax reform bill in 1986) andspeculativelending
by savings—and—loans. Square footage put in place in commercial and
industrial construction combined was lower in 1991 than in anyyearsince
19611 almost all of this decline took place in the commercial sector. There
also was a sharp drop in residential construction in 1990 and1991.
The most notable trend in the composition of the industry is the ricing
share of commercial construction in the 1980g. this sector, which represented
about 10 percent of all activity before the l980s, grew to 17 percent in the
latter part of that decade. Industrial construction has declined in
importance. There also has been a slow but steady drop in the share of public
constructionfrom 30 percent in the late 1960s to 20 percent for much of the
1980s. Most of this drop comes from construction by state and local
governments. The federal government's direct share tell by one percentage
point in the 1980s. The change in its indirect share is impossible to gauge
because there is no breakdown in the state and local construction series by
whether the projects axe fully or partially funded by the federal government.
Whatimplications do these developments in the construction industry
have for industrial relations? The most significant fact is that despite the
growth in output a1demploymentthat took place between 1983 and 1989,
'Atthe time of this writing, the Commerce Department has suspended
publication of its real output by industry series since 1989. To document the
industry'ssituation in the early 1990., I use instead the data on value and
squarefootage put in place, published on a monthlybasis by the Commerce
Department.4
economicconditions largely have checked the pressure forwage increases.
Unemployment intheindustry never got below 10 percent in the 1980., in
contrast to1966-69 when it got down to 6 percent. The peakyear for
commercialand industrial construction was 1985, but square footageput in
placethatyear was below the previous peakin 1979 andcomparable tothe
level observed at the 1973 peak. This indicate, that even in thehealthiest
sector of the industry, there was less pressure on wages than inprevious
expansions.
Second, the declining share of public sector construction implies thata
smaller share of construction jobs are being covered byprevailing wage laws.'
These laws still frequently require union wage scales to bepaid to all
workers, thereby discouraging nonunion contractors from bidding for thistype
of work. With fewer jobs being covered by these laws, thecompetitiveness of
the open shop increased.
Third, even though increased commercial constructionnormally would mean
more jobsforunion workers, this may not have been the case in the 1980g.
Much of the new off ice and retail space was put inplace in new suburbs and
almost all of this work was done by theopen shop.
II. THE WORKERS
Changes in worker characteristics in the constructionindustry are
reported in Table 1. Construction workers becameyounger, with the average
age declining from 37.0 to 35.7 between 1977—78 and 1989. The trendin the
overall labor force runs in the opposite direction becauseof the aging of the
baby—boomer.. Construction isanexception because of a large drop—offin the
'Prevailingwage laws set minimum wage rates that are usually well, above
the federal minimum wage for governmen—fndactivities. The Davie—Eacon Act setsminimumwages for construction projects that are federally funded.
Most states also have their ownprevailing wage laws in construction, For
discussions of the provisions of these laws and theireconomic impact, see Allen (1983) and Thieblot (1986).S
percentageof workers 45 and over (from 31.1 to 23.7 percent ofthelabor
force).
Theracial mix of employment is an especially sensitiv, issue in
construction. Even after the passage of the CivilRightsAct of 1964, many
unionlocals continued to engage in overt discrimination by race. A number of
policies were implemented to deal with thi. issue, including increased
enrollmentof blacks in apprenticeship programs, regulations setting minimal
ratios for minority employment in publicly funded projects, set—aside programs
forminority contractors, and, of course, litigation.
Despite these efforts, there was very little change in the racial
composition of the construction labor force in the 1980s. The percentage of
black employees did not change between 1977—78 and 1989. The union sector of
construction has made very fiodest progress in hiring minorities, but there has
been absolutely no progress in the open—shop. Tabulations from the public use
tapesof the current Population Survey showthat the percentage of union
employees whowerewhite dropped modestly from 90.6 to 89.0 percent, whereas
the percentage of nonunion employees who were white stayed at 91 percent in
both periods.'
Schooling and occupation are signals of the skill level of the
workforce. Schooling levels for workers in the industry rose in the 1980s.
In1977—78, 35.4percent of the workers had not completed high school; this
figurehad dropped to 24.4 percent in 1989. A smaller share of workers is
employedasmanagers and laborers,whereas a larger share is employed in
skilled crafts.1 Because of changes in the occupational code used by the
3lronically, underutilization of minorities inunion construction is
usuallycited as ar argument for repealing prevailing wage laws.
'rhe occupational codewas changed between the 1971—78and1989 CPS. To
make thecodes comparable,the1977—78 data were converted into the more
recentcoding scheme using: a Census Bureau concordance mappingthree—digit occupations under the old code to one—digit occupations under the new code.6
Census Bureau, it is possible to make exact comparisons for a limited set.3
Carpenters dropped from 16,7 to 13.3 percent of the labor force and painters
dropped from 5.6 to 4.0 percent, whereas electricians increased from 4.1 to
5.5 percent of the labor force. More importantly, the combined share in the
traditionalskilled occupations categories droppedfrom 36.8 to 32.6 percent.
Althougha larger share of construction workers were employed in skilled
production jobs, a smaller share was employed in the traditional building
trades. This is indicative of a transformation in the nature of work across
traditional occupational lines. Further evidence in support of such a trend
is the increase in the share of workers in a skilled trade but no specific
occupationfrom 0.2 to 2.1 percent.
III. LABORINSTITUTIONSIN CONSTRUCTION
Historical background. The birthof today's union movement in the
buildingtrades can be traced to Peter HcGuire's launching of the United
Brotherhoodof Carpenters and Joiners in 1881. Most other international
unionsin the building trades were organized by the end of the 19th century.
Union growth dependedon organizing efforts andemployer resistance. The
building trades offered workers improved wagss, hours, and working conditions,
often along with benefits in case of illness or death, in return for an
initiation fee, union dues, and loyalty.
Union growthinthis era hinged notonlyon overcoming employer
resistance, but also on ability to compete with other unions. This was an
especially touchy issue in the building tradse because of the jurisdictional
issues that arose from their craft structure. Disputes over which union had
jurisdiction over which types of construction work were the main reason that
Srhemismatch rate in the concordance between the 1970 and 1980codes for
theseoccupations is 1 percent or less ofthe count of persons in those
occupations. In terms ofoccupationalshares, thi. amounts to an error rate
that is well below 0.1 psrcdnt of all workers.7
the American Federation of Labor created its Building and ConstructionTrade.
Department (BCTD) in 1908.
Althoughthere are numerous historical account, of the origins ofthe
building trades union., moat of the focus is on personalities,strategies, and
ideologies withinthe union movement itself; relatively little iswritten from
the standpoint of the employer. Most shops were very small andmany employers
had been union member, themselves. In area. where most workers ina trade
wereorganized, employershadlittlechoice but to deal with theunionand its
businessagent. Agents were quick to size up the opportunities in a situation
of such asymmetric bargaining power ——unionracketeering became a serious
problem in a number of cities.' Secondary boycott. wore frequently used when
the building trades needed additional leverage. Segal (1970,p. 53) argues
that the relationship was beneficial in some ways for the employer. The
plumbers' union providedlobbying supporton issues such a.buildingCodes and
licensing;italeohelped limit competition by setting uniform wage rates and
limiting labor supply. Employer associations gradually wore formed on a craft
basis in most major urban areas and these becamebargainingunits.
Well before the Wagner Act, the prehire agreement wasthe principal
instrumentto commit contractors to use union labor. Under such an agreement,
a contractor or an association of contractors would agree to hire union
membersat given wage rates and work rules overa specific tine horizon. This
practicecontinued to prevail even after passage of the Wagner Act because of
the logistical difficulties of using elections to gauge employee preferences
for union representation in the constEuction industry. Righ turnover
precludesthe stable attachment between a group of workers andanindividual
contractor that is necessary for an lItREelection; most constructionjobs
wouldbe over long before the lItRE ever got around to counting the ballot..
Technically speaking, prehire agreements violated the Wagner Act because
recognition was given to the union without the consent of the precise set of
4See Christie <(1956) for an account of union corruption at the turn of
the century.8
individuals who would be the contractor', actual employees. This issuewas
ignored from 1935 to 1947. In 1948, the ULRB carried out apilotprogram of
construction elections and found, to no one's surprise, that the costsware
staggering. Eventually prehire agreement. were legally authorized when Title
VII of the Landrum—Griff in Act of 1959 added section 8(f) to the lanA.
Theunions. Almost all, unionizedworker,inthe constructionindustry
arerepresented by one of the 15 national union, in the BaD.' Since the time
of the last IRRA—sponsored survey o industrial relations in the construction
industry by Mills (1980), there have been two mergers within the Building
Trades. OnAugust16, 1979, the International UnionofWood, Wire and Natal
Lathers merged with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America.On November 10, 1988, theTile, Marble, Terrazzo, Finishers,
Shopworkers,and Granite Cutters International. Union merged with the
Carpenters and Joiqçrs. A former member of the building trades —— the
Teamsters —— rejoined the fold in 1987, when the Teamsters reaffiliated with
the AFL—CIO. The buildingtrades arelistedin Table 2, along with their
membershipin 1979 and 1989 as reported by the unions to the AFL—CIO.
Excluding the Teamsters, membership in the Building Trade. unions
droppedby 320,000 in the 1980s, a 9.9 percent decline. In absolute terms,
the unions suffering the largest drop. in membershipwere theelectrical
worker.(81,000), the boilermakers (54,000) andthelaborers (69,000). (Many
of the losses of the first twounions took placein manufacturing.)In
proportionalterms, the unions losing the most members were the boilermaker.
(42 percent), bricklayers (21), iron workers (24), painter.(20), and
plasterers(22).
Thereare some notable exceptions, to this overall pattern of declining
membership. Two unions actually became larger in the l9BOsi the elevator
'The only other major union that bargains for workers inthe industry i. the United Steelworkers of America, which absorbed the UnitedMine Workers' District 50 in a 1973 merger. The union repre.ent. 8,450construction
workers, most of whom do heavy—and—highway work in Pennsylvania, West Virginia,Xsntucky, and NewJersey (Zt!B, April 26, 1990, p. 40). The union containsworker, from all crafts, which, it claims, leads to greater
efficiency by eliminating jurisdictional di.putes.9
constructors (6,000 increase) and the operating engineer. (17,000). Twovery
large unions -—thecarpenters and the plumber. —sawtheir membership
decline only slightly.
Management orcanizatione. Most contractors aretoo small tohave their
ownlabor relations staff. If they join theirlocal general or specialty
contractorassociation, they get representation in contract negotiations and
assistance with the resolution of grievance.. Local contractor association.
also help administer apprenticeship program. and provide services outside the
labor relations arena, such as lobbying, public relations, and legal advice.
There are about 65 national associations that represent general or
specialty contractors.' The most visible associations include the Associated
Builders and Contractors, an open-shop organization of mostly specialty
contractors; the Associated General Contractors, a group that is mostly union;
and the National Association of Rome Builders, the largest organization that
is mostly open-shop. In addition to a.sisting their local chapters, these
national organizations provide public relations, research and lobbying
services.
The interests of the owners of construction projects were first
represented in 1969 with the formation of the Construction Users •Pnti—
Inflation Roundtable, consisting of 200 of the nations leading chief
executive officers. This group mergsd in 1972 into the Business Roundtable, a
broader organization that maintains a Construction Coat Effectiveness Task
Force. The Business Roundtable has encouraged any and all steps that it feels
would lower construction costs, including opening up bidding to open—shop
contractorsand bargaining to makeadjustments inunion contracts.
Bargaining structure. The unionized portion of the industry is
concentrated in the commercial, industrial, and heavy andhighwaysectors. In
most cases, especially in commercial construction, bargaining takes place at
the local level between an association of contractors andeithera local union
'The January/February 1991 issue of Construction Review, published by the
U.S. Department ofCommerce,includes a directoryof contractor organizations.10
or a district council of locals. Usually local negotiations arelimitedto a
singletrade. When contracts for the various crafts. expire at differenttimes
of the year, there is a heightened risk of a strikeor lockout relative to
otherindustries. A number of institutional mechanisms have evolvedto deal
with this risk, including formalnegotiations involving several trades at once
and contracts that expire at the same time acrossdifferent trades. In the
late l960s and early. 1970s, the staggered structure ofbargainingin
constructionwas blamed for unusually highwage settlements. Manylocals
followed a practice called "leapfrogging, where thenegotiated settlement in
onetrade creates pressure for even larger settlements innegotiations for
othertrades in that area and in nearby areas.
Although local agreements are the most common practice, theyare not
universal. Often there is a statewide agreement forheavy and highway
construction. The bargaining unit is national in pipeline and elevator
construction,aswell as some industrial construction projects.
Even when wages are negotiated locally, most unions havea national
contract that applies to traveling contractors. Thesecontracts tend to be
short statements that the contractor will use union laborboth directly and
through all subcontracts and will pay unionscale,either as specified in the
local agreement or, ifnosuch agreement exists, the national agreement. This
arrangement protects the contractor from holdup problems with the localunions
and it relieves the local unions from the risk ofbeing unable to organize the
project. Local unions and contractor associations have beenknown to
complain,however, if duringa strike or lockout an outside contractor
continues working under the nationalagreement.
A practice that has become increaeingly morecommon in the building
trades is the project agreement. Theseagreements usually cover very large
projects such as industrial or power plants construction wherework goes on
for many years. Typically these contractsare designed to make union labor
more competitive by including a no—strike pledge, withspecific procedures to
settle any disputes, along with concessionsonwork rules. aetween 1979and11.
1981 there were 92 project agreements grantedor pending, covering83,344
employees. By 1986 there were 265 such agreements covering 117,185
employe•
Human resource Dractices. Must worker, complete an apprenticeship to
enter a union in the building trades? Do unionized employers have to hire
everyone through the hiring hall? Researchers who interview contractor, find
widespread misconceptions about which human resourc. practices actually are
followed,not to mention their effectivenees.
1. Training. Virtually all skills in the building trades are
marketable across a wide range of employers. In this situation, according to
Becker's model of investment in training, the employer has no economic
incentive to train unless (1) the costs of training can be passed to the
workervia lower wages and benefits or (2) no trained labor is available in
the market, in which case the training cost is a substitute for a general wage
increase. One unique aspect of apprenticeship programs is that they encourage
investments in training by shifting some of the costs of training from the
workerto other parties. Apprentices start at 50percent of journeyman scale,
with increases as they move through the program. Pay tends to be below
productivity in the first year or two of the program, but above productivity
near the end, so that the employer and the trainee share the costs. In
addition, administrative costs are paid for by taxpayers and by all union
workers, who are assessed a fee for each hour worked to fund apprenticeships.
Apprenticeship programs traditionally have produced well—rounded, highly
skilled workers. Most programs run from three to five years and involve a
combination of on—the—job and classroom training. A substantial majority of
the programs in the building trades areaffiliatedwith the unionized sector.
Theunions recognize that their membersmust bevery skilled to command the
'NationalConstruction Employers council and the Building and
Construction Trades Department, AFL—CIO(1986),p. 11.
1°The most thorough and recent such study is Bourdon and Levitt (1980).
The discussion below also draws from Mills (1972), Foster (1973), Northrup and
Foster (1975), Marshall j. (1975), Allen (1984), and Northrup (1984).12
wages specified in the contract. If the skills of newly hired workers tall
relative tothose ofexperiencedworkers, the counon wage scale cannot be
maintained.At the same time, unions recognize thatthe apprenticeship
program's size must be controlled. The size of today'sprogram determinesthe
supply of skilled labor in the future. In addition, unions have beenwary
that employers will use apprenticeship programs as acheaper substitute for
experienced labor.
Repeated studies have shown that most union members have notcompleted
union apprenticeship programs. Apprenticeships are the mainsource of entry
for bricklayers, plumbers, sheet metal workers, and electriciansbut not for
carpenters and ironworkers. In the most carefully done quantitativestudy of
this issue, Marshall flj.(1975) found that the two most important
alternative sources of training were working as laborersor helpers on union
Job sites or informal on—the-job training in theopen shop.
Union apprenticeship programs remain the mostimportant source of
training in the industry today, but this does notexempt then from criticism.
Northrup(1984) argues that relatively few Jobsrequire the multi—faceted
skillstaught in the programs. The Business Roundta.ble(198Th) study of
apprenticeship programs criticized the practice of advancingthrough the
programs based on timeinthe program rather than on skills mastered. It also
criticized federal andstateregulation of apprenticeship programs for setting
standards that often limit governmentsupport to union programs.
Traditionally mostworkersin the open shop have received their training
on the job. Business Roundtable (1982c) found thatalthough the open shop had
60 percent of the constructionmarket, it accounted for merely 10 percent of
the expenditures on training.Apprenticeship programs are administered by the
AssociatedGeneral Contractors (AQC)and the Associated Builders and
Contractors(ABC) Formal, but these remain relatively small. Largeopen—shop
contractors such as BE&Ex, Brown & Root, andFlour Daniel have conducted their
owntask—oriented programs for some time. similarapproaches have been
developed by many ABCchaptersviatheWheels of Learning program in the 1980s13
andthe currentprogramsbeingoperatedbythe MeritShop Foundation.
2.Hiring. Most hiring by union contractors is done through informal
mechanisms,such as applications at the gate andcontact, made through
friends and relatives •Contractsoften call for all hiringto be done through
thehiring hall, but in practice the hiring ball is most likely to be used
when informal mechanisms fail to yield enough applicants. Hiring halls
usually are capable of providing adequate numbers of workers who meet minimum
competencystandards,thereby reducing recruiting and screening cost, for
unioncontractors.
The Business Roundtable (1982a) criticised certain aspects ofhiring
procedures in the union sector, arguing that somelocals impose restrictions
onthe selection of supervisorsor use the hiring ball to put pressure on
contractors by limiting the quantity or quality ofreferrals. The National
ConstructionEmployers Council and the Building and Construction Trades
Department of the AFL—CIo (1985) addrs.sed the foreman issue in its Market
Recovery Program Handbook, which encouraged locals to give contractors
responsibilityfor decisions involving foremen. Their 1986 study found that
between 1980 and 1985 the share of local agreements that allowedmanagement to
choose foremen increased from 82 to 92 percent1 whereas the share of contracts
withno specified ratio of foremen to journeymen rose from 50 to 61 percent.
obviously, employers in the open shop face no restrictions on their
choices of recruiting methods or their selection of employees. Open shop
contractor organizations have experimented with hiring halls, but most hiring
is done through informal methods in smaller firms and through state—of—the—art
screeningmethods in the largest ones.
3.Work organisation. Work at union jobsites is organised around the
principleof craft jurisdiction. Under this work system, each task is
allocated to one of the building trades, in effect giving that trade property
rights over a range of work assignments. The only benefit to employers from
thissystem is that as long as the local maintains its skill and training
standards for membership, it provide, some protection against shoddy14
workmanship,e. g., if a worker falsely claims he has a particular skill.
Thisbenefit is rather meager relative to the costs. Jurisdictional rules
frequently dictate that skilled journeymen do work that could have been done
by semiskilled and unskilled, labor. In addition, they restrict flexibility in
work assignments when two different trades areclosesubstitutes.
Unioncontracts sometimes specify minimum crew sizes, forbid supervisors
topick up tools, orrestrict the ratios of helpers and apprentices to
Journeymen. When enforced, these provisions can increase construction costs
considerably.The case study evidence on this issue indicates that these
provisions often areignoredand, even when they areenforced,tend toaffect
costs only on smallprojects. The Business Roundtable (l982a) estimated that
crew size restriction, raise costs by $42 million par year. Econometric
evidence in Allen (1986c) shows that restrictions on substitution between
different types of labor increase costs by 2 percent.
In a few areas, the building trades have restricted management from
using the best available technology. In the early l970s, only 12 percent of
union contractscontained limitson prefabricated, components or on tools and
equipment.However, over 70 percent of the contracts with plumbers and sheet—
metal workers had restrictions on prefabrication and over 80 percent of
painters' contracts had limits on toolsand equipment at that time. Tenyears
later, Business Roundtable (1982a) reported, "While a minor percentage of all
contracts sampled contain prefabrication limits, these restrictive clauses
were found in one-half of the pipefitter/plumber contracts." They estimated
that across all types of construction these restrictions raised costs by $30
million.
In the open shop contractors have complete flexibility in assigning
tasks to workers and selecting materials, tools, andequipment.Without craft
jurisdictions, workers are trained to learn skillsthat cut aàross a numberof
trades. Without ratios specified in the contract, the employer is free to use
any mixoflaborers, semiskilled, and skilled labor. This is always cited as
the main competitive advantage of the open shop. -.15
XV.UNION DENSITY
The Current Population Survey has contained a question about union
membership in the Øay survey in 1970 and from 1973 to 1981; a question on
contract coverage was added in 1978. Since 1983, these question, have been
part of the monthly survey. The same union membership question appeared in
1966 in the Survey of Economic Opportunity. This information was used to
calculate an internally consistent series in Table 3 of the percentage of all
employees in the construction industry who are union members or who are
covered by collective bargaining agreements.
Between1970 and 1992, union density (the percentage of employees who
reportthemselvesto be union members)in the construction industry has fallen
almost byhalf. In 1970, 42 percent of the employees in the construction
industry were union members; in 1992, only 22 percent were. The downward
trend in union density has been steady ——throughoutthe 1970. andthe first
halfof the 1980s, it dropped by an average of one percentage pointperyear.
Particularly large declines were observed between May1977 and 1978 (4
percent) and May 1981 and 1983 (5 percent). Thi. decline •topped after 1987;
since then, union density has stayed at 22 percent. The pattern for coverage
by collective bargaining agreements is quite similar.
Union density follows a concave pattern with respect to age,
growing rapidly for workers in their 20s andearly30. but then peaking out
and remaining flat for workers in their 40. and 50.. This pattern reflects
the fact that it takes three to four years to becomesufficientlytrained to
becomea union journeyman. Also, many young workers spend some time working
in construction, especially as unskilled workers on open shop residential
projects, but do not make a career of it.
Union density dropped across all age groups during the 1980s,• with the
largestdeclines taking placeamongyounger andmiddle—aged workers. There
are two aspect.to this decline that areimportant. tounderstand. (1)union
membership still increases with age, but at a much slower rate, and (2) union16
membershiprates actually declined for most cohorts. Figure 1 breaks down the
differencebetween union density in 1977—78 and 1989 for private wage and
salary workers in blue—collar occupations into two componentet (1) a within—•
cohort change, indicated by the distance between the line labelled l989
actual and that labelled l989, no change within cohortr and tl)an across—
cohort change, indicated by. the spread between the latter line and that
labelled "1977—78.
consider the drop in union density for workar aged 35 to 39 frost 49
percent in 1977—78 to 26 percent in 1989. In 1977—78, 36 percent of all
workers aged 25 to 29 were union members, so the within—cohort drop in union
density is 10 percentage points. If the 1977—78 patterns for union density by
age had held up, however, the union density rate for this age group would have
been 49 percent. Thus, the failure of union density to increase with age for
this cohort accounts for another 13 point, of the decline.
Figure 1 shows that for workers between 40 and 54 in 1989, the within—
cohort change accounted for most of the drop in unionization, whereas for
workers under 40 the across—cohort effects dominated. This indicates that the
decline in union density in the building trades is being driven by two very
different forces. Thu odds that middle—aged and older construction workers
wouldbe union members are lower than they were for the•amecohort 10 to 15
years ago. Although it is possible that this results from mobility of workers
from other industries who were never organized, the more plausible explanation
is that many of the nonunion workers who are 40 and over are former union
members. The other force at work is that workers in the new generation of
construction workers have not been organized. Because many of them are now in
their 30s, it is unlikely that they will ever get the type of training that
will qualify them for union journeyman status. The building trades have
probably lost this generationof workers.
Other oersonal characteristics. The decline in union density was
inversely related to education level.. Among worker. who did not complete
high school, union density dropped by 20 percentage point., in contrast to a17
15percentage point drop forthos,with high school degrees andan11
percentage pointdrop among thosewith somecollege.Union membership rate.
forwhites and nonwhites were moreorless the sameinboth 1977—78 and 1989.
A higher percentage ofmenbelongs to unions than women in both years, but the
proportional declipe in union density was about thesame for men (38percent)
and women (36 percent).
Occupation. In both the 1977—78 and 1989 samples, union density ismuch
higherfor skilled occupations than for handlers, helpers, and laborers.
There are six craft occupations that (a) were defined in nearly the same way
inboth the 1977—78and 1989 CPS and(b) had sample cites of 100 or mars in
bothyears. The drop in union density i.muchlarger for painters (30 to 11
percent) and roofers (36 to 11) than for brickmasons and stonemasons (44to
32), carpenters (31 to 17), electricians (58 to 40), and plumbers and
pipefitters(56 to 41). This is consistent with thepattern in Table 1 where
thedeclines in membership of the painters androofersunions were
proportionally larger than the decline across all building trades. Painting
and roofing are generally considered to be less skill—intensive than masonry,
carpentry, plumbing and electrical work. Unless there are offsetting wage
differentials, this would create a greater incentive for building owners and
contractors to find nonunion substitutes in the less skilled occupations.
V.EXPLAINING THEDECLINE INUNIONDENSITY
Employersare most likely to sign and abide by collective bargaining
agreements when three conditions hold. First, unions must have a near—
monopoly on the supply of skilled labor, which is most likely in areas with
active union apprenticeship programs. second, the union must have enough
solidarity to make strike threats credible and costly to employers. Because
of workers' ability to work for a wide range of employers, including those
outside construction, and the high costs of delays to builders, union strike18
threatsare quite powerful in a tight labor market. Third, union labor must
be batter trained and more experienced so that the employer gets higher
productivityinreturn for higher wages.Itthis last condition does not
hold,the employer hasan incentive to renege on his relationship with the
union.
The discussion here will examine four plausible explanations for the
decline in union density; (1) wages and benefits have increased more for union
than for nonunion workers; (2) the productivity advantage of union labor has
eroded; (3) contractors and owners have adopted strategies to control labor
costs; and(4) the labor lawshave been re—interpreted to give contractors
more flexibility in choosing their collective bargaining status.3'
Wages and benefits. Table 4 updates the estimates of union—nonunion
wage gaps from Allen (1988a). The first column reports the estimates from
that study for 1967, 1970,and May 1973—1983. The second column reports
estimatesfor May 1973—1981 and the full year 1983—1986 from Linneman
(1990). The third column reports estimates for the full—year 1983—1992 that
were generously provided by Professor Barry Hirsch of Florida State
university, using a data base he developed with his colleague Professor David
Macpherson. Even though the results are all obtained from the same data set
(CPS), my estimates are somewhat larger than the others. Thi. happens because
of modest differences in control variables and model specification.'1
The union—nonunion wage gap widened by a considerable margin in the late
1960sand the early l970a. In 1967, union wages were 38 percenthigher than
"Another possible factor, changes in worker and employercharacteristics, wasexamined in Allen (1988a) and found to be unimportant. This conclusion
did not change when I updated the analysis.
"tinneman al. (1990) estimated a model across workers from all
industries with different intercepts for union and nonunion workers in
construction, whereas I estimate a model over workers in theconstruction
industry only. In effect I have complete interactions between industry and
all coefficients in the model, whereas they have anindustry—intercept interaction.Theother difference is that include controls for overtime hours
anda set of regional labor market characteristics in their model, whereas I do not. Hirsch restricts his sample to constructionworkers, but uses a different set of control variables. Us includes part—time status andveteran status, but does not include occupation.19
nonunion wages, whereas by 1973 the gap had widened to 54 percent. Such &
tremendouschange in relative cost. coupled with the weak attachment. between
workersand individual employersin the industry surely helped precipitate the
declineinuniondensityin the 197Cc. In 1979 both setsof estimates drop by
over ten percentage points, but they increaseintheearly 1980.sothat by
1983both are higher than in 1979although wellbelow what they were in 1973—
78.The Hirsch resãlts show that the union—nonunion wage differential dropped
bynine percentage pointsfrom1986 to 1992.
Thewagedifferential between union and nonunionlaboris much lower
todaythan itwasin the middle of the 1970. and is comparable to the wage
differentialin1967. If wage differential. weretheonly factor driving the
declinein union density,thenthe unionized sectorwouldhavestarted
recovering market chars in the 1980e instead of continuing to drop. Although
a widening wage gap was no doubt a keyfactorbehind the initial decline in
union density, we must look elsewherefor anexplanationof why that decline
continuedin the 1980s.
There are no data on benefit costs in construction broken down by union
status. The most expensive voluntary benefits arehealth insurance and
retirementplans. The CPS supplements on benefit coverage for May1979 and
1988were used to calculate the proportion of union andnonunionworkers in
construction who work for employers that provide these benefits. There has
been no change in pension coverage or participation rates for either union or
nonunion contractors. Pensions are provided by the employer of 90 percent of
union membersand33 percent of nonunion workers in both years. Health
insurance- coverage is down from 89 to 80 percent amongunionmembers. The
chars of nonunion contractots that provide health insurancehas gone up from
one—halfto two-third..The criticalelement that ismissing from these data
isthegenerosityof thepensionandhealthplans. A largeincreasein
pension and health care costs percovered worker in unioncontracts relative
tothe openshop would offset the narrowing of the gap in health care
coverage. -.20
Ptoductiyity, The competitiveness of union labor depends not juston
the wage differential with the open shop, but also on the productivity
differential. In an economy—wide study using data from the Census of
Construction Industries, I found in Allen (1984) that in 1972 labor
productivity is much higher in the unionized sector of the industry than in
the open shop and that the estimated productivity difference between unionand
nonunion labor is about the same as the wage difference. Thisfinding was
further supported in my studies (Allen (l986a, 1986b, 1988b)) ofcoumiercial
office buildings, private hbspitals, and retailspace. However, in public
construction, my studies of schools andhospitals(Allen (l986a, 1986b)) find
no productivity difference between union andnonunioncontractors, which I
attributeto prevailing wage laws that shelter union contractors from theopen
shop and insensitivity of the owners ofthese structures to their cost.
All of these studies use data that were collected between 1973and 1917.
I reexamined the situation with economy—wide data for 1982 inAllen (1988a)
and found evidence that the union productivityadvantage had eroded. The best
availabledata set for revisiting the questionof how union and nonunion
productivitycompare is the 1981 Census of Construction Industries. In
previous studies usingthe 1971 and 1982 Census data, I was able to construct
adata set in which each state would have threeobservations; one for each
two-digit industry. The Current Population Survey no longer identifiestwo—
digit industry for construction employees and this information isoften
suppressed in smaller states in the Census reports. As aconsequence, the
sampleused here consists of 51 observations, one for each state.To
facilitate compariong between 1982 and 1987, 1 re—estimatedthe model for
thatyear using the same aggregation scheme.
The point estimate, of the union productivityadvantage in both 1982 and
1987 are implausibly large —— 101 percent in 1982 and 76percent in 1987,
both figures are well above the range of the union—nonuniondifferential in
wages.This indicates that the use of data aggregated by state issomehow
producinga serious upward bias in the union coefficient. If this bias is the21
sameinthe 1987 and the aggregated 1982 data, the change in the union
coefficientwill still indicate the direction in which the union—nonunion
productivity difference is moving, admittedly a big if. The productivity
advantage ofunion overnonunioncontractorshas a 95percentconfidence
interval of 63 to 139 percent in 1982andoneof 52 to100 percent in 1987.
Theseresults indicate that the odd. of a decrease in the union productivity
advantage are greater than the odds of an increase, but offer little insight
into the magnitude'of whatever change has taken place.
Management action. Partially in response to the high strike rates and
rapid wage inflation of the late 1960.andearly 1970s, the owners of
construction projects and the contractors that they employ have taken a much
more active role in controlling labor costs, steps that often involve
switching from union to open—shop contractors. The Construction Users' Anti—
Inflation Roundtable, which later evolved into the Business Roundtable, was
established as a mechanism to help give large industrial firms better control
over their construction costs.
The Roundtable has done two major studies highlighting problem. in cost
effectiveness in the industry. The 1974 study dealt exclusively with problem.
inthe unionized sector of the construction industry: jurisdictional problems,
hiring halls, scheduled overtime, andrestorationof the role of management.
The 1983 study was more wide—ranging. Although it dealt with collective
bargaining, italso examined project management issues relevant to union and
open—shop construction, as well as construction technology and government
regulation.
The Roundtable also has acted in a lobbying capacity to deal with legal
and regulatory issues related to construction costs. Although the Roundtable
has not explicitly called for project owners to switch to the open shop, it
hasengaged in a number of activities that increase the likelihood of such
switches.These include sharing information about union activities and
educating managers about strategies to deal with union issues. The impact of
the Roundtable on union density cannot be quantified, but that does not mean22
itis negligible.
Many of the firms that decide to use union labor on a particular
constructionproject do so to maintain goodrelationsin their own collective
bargaining arrangements. The overall declin, in union density in the private
sector has made it loss likely that firms will unilaterally decide to use
union labor when they build newoffices and plants. Thishas happened in part
becauseof simple shift—share factors and in part because the firms that still
haveunionizedworkforces are less likely to have company policies that
automatically call for union contractors when construction needs arise.
Laborlaws and their Snterpretatjon. The premise at the timethat
prehire agreements were legally recognired by Landrum—Griffin wasthat if
employees decided to change their repreBentative or to become open shop, they
would follow the same procedure as in other industries, namely to file a
petition and have an election." This introduced an asymmetryintothelaw
with which someemployerswere never comfortable.Theywere free to enter
into a prehire agreement, but they had to go through an NLRBelectionto get
out of one.
In R.J. Smith Construction Co., 191 NLRB693(1971), the Board decided
that either party could unilaterally pull out of a prehire agreement unless
theunion had proven that it represented a majority of a contractor's
employees. The timing of this decision reflects two factors: (1) Republicans
returned to the White House in 1969 and, with a lag, were able to influence
the composition of the NLRB and (2) rising union wage rates and an
unprecedented number of strikes in the late 1960s had created more pressure
for a shift in bargaining power toward employers. This doctrine was amended
in John Deklewa an4 Sons. Inc., 281 NLRB 184 (1987) to prevent unilateral
repudiation during the period when the agreement wasineffect. However, upon
"In writing this sectionofthe paper, I have drawn heavily from Northrup
(1989)and the testimony in U.S. Senate, Coittee on Labor and Human
Resources, construction Industry Labor Law Amendments of 1987, Senate Hearing
100—220 (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Of fice, 1987), especially
the prepared statements of Arthur F.Rosenfeld,special assistant to the
solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor, and Robert A. Georgine, president of the
Building and construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO.23
expiration, contractor. were not obligated to bargain for anew agreement,"
The union, received another serious blow in Peter fletqjtandSons, Inc.,
206 NLRB 562 (1973). Kiewit had an agreement with the
Operating Engineer, for
highway construction in Oklahoma for years. In 1972, theybrought in a
subsidiarycalled South Prairie Construction Company,which •tarted bidding
for the same work in the same state on a nonunion basis.The subsidiary
started getting contract, as Kiewit became increasinglyreluctant to submit
bids. The ruling in 1973held thatKiewit had not violated the NLItA. The
casethen went to the Court ofAppeals and the Supreme Court, which sent the
case back to the NLRB.
The final NLRB decision (231 NLRB 76 (1977))setup two tests to
determine whether the practice of setting up a nonunionsubsidiary, now called
"double—breasting," was legally permissible, first, when a contractor ha.
union and nonunion subsidiaries, it mint be determined whethera "single
employer exists. This i. a purely qualitative test that dependson the
interrelation of operations, common management, and centralizedcontrol of
labor relations. Second, there is the question of whether theworker, in the
subsidiaries have a sufficient comnunity of interests" to be inthe same
bargaining unit. In making this decision, the Board is to consider "the
bargaining history, the financial integration of operations, the differences
in the types of work and skills of employees, the extentof centralisation of
management and supervision, particularly in regard to labor relations, hiring,
discipline, and control of day—to—day operations, and the extent of
interchange and contact between groups of employees. (Kiewit 1977)"
Another interpretation of the act that is used in some cases is knownas
the "alter ego doctrine." Suppose a company transfers its assetsand business
to a nonunion affiliate. Even though the originalcompany has disappeared in
a legal sense, all that essentially has changed i. the name of the firmand,
of course, it, collective bargaining status. It has thesame equipment,
ownership, management, and customers and sometime, the same employees. Under
"See Poltz (1990) for a more detailed discussion of Dekiewa.24
thisdoctrine, the successor company is the alter ego of the original company
and cannot escape its collective bargaining obligation., regardless of whether
there is a coatunity of interest, for the employees.
At the time of Kiewit, the practice of doublebreasting was relatively
rare in the industry. Northrup and Foster (1975) mentioned the appearance of
the practice in a number of areas and predicted that it would become
widespread. Their gift for prophecy I. documented in Northrup'. (1984)
follow—upbook. By 1983,43of the50 largest contractors in the United
Stateswere unionized; of these 43, 22 had doubiebreasted affiliate..
The Smith, Dekiewa, and Kiewit decisions reduced the cost of terminating
a collective bargaining relationship. In their aftermath, a new market
developed under which contractors could buy legal and strategic advice on how
to switch to the open shop.'1 The timing of these decisions coincides exactly
with the beginning of the decline in union density. Except for the rather
modest revisions to the Smith doctrine under Dekiewa, the force of these
decisions has not been diluted in subsequent years. They are clearlypart of
theexplanation of declining union density because (1) they gave employers
mor. flexibility in selecting their union status and (2) even employers who
had no ob:jectionE to unions on either economic Or ideological grounds found
themselvesfaced with rising competition from the open shop, no small part of
which came from double—breasted contractors.
Allen (1993) presents econometricevidence that the impact of theKiewit
decisionmay be especially crucial. Before this case was finally resolved,
the year-to—year variation in percentage union in the industry could be
explained very well in terms of a single variable —theunit cost difference
between union and nonunion labor. After the Kiewit decision, union density
dropsand, more critically, the correlation between relative unit cost and
union density vanishes.
Despite theseUegal shocks, two other factors should not be overlooked.
'3Yora good example of such advice, see the appendix by A. Samuel Cook,
Esq.in Northrup (1984).25
The construction industryhas gonethrough two very depres.edperiodsover the
last 15 years and unemployment has been persistently high. In tighter labor
markets,contractors who broke prehire agreements or went doublebreasted would
havefaced damaging strikes. In the 1980. the threat to withhold labor was
not a credible one.
Thepublic image of the building trades is anotherfactor that certainly
hasnot helped in their fight against the open-shop. Manybabyboomers formed
ahighlyunfavorable image when hardhat, disrupted demonstration, against the
Vietnam War. The reputation ofdiscriminationagainst blacksand women
remains despite data showing that the underutilization problem ii slightly
more severe in the open-shop. A few locals have resorted to violence to try
to intimidate owners, contractor., and project owners. Finally, in New York
city and other areas, the locals remain corrupted by organized crime."
The Building Trade, have pushed repeatedly for labor law reforms to
restore the long—term recognition of prehire agreements and to eliminate
doublebreasting. These bills were approved by the U.S. House of
Representatives in the 99th and 100th Congress but never made it through the
Senate.'7
The1980s also saw a number of legislative battles over prevailing wage
laws. Under Senate Bill 1171, introduced in 1983, the dollar threshold for
coverageby Davis—Bacon would have been increased from $2,000 to $100,000 and
the definition of prevailing wage would have been changed to greatly reduce
theodds that it would be set at union scale." This legislation inst thesame
fate as the bills on doublebreasting and prehire agreement..
There ha. been more prevailing wage action at the state level. Until
'SeeNorthrup (1984, pp. 351—371) for a discussion of union violence and
Ichniow,kiand Preston (1989) for an examination of union corruption and
racketeering in New York City.
17Hearings were held for H.R. 281 in 1985 and 1987 andforS. 492 in 1987.
'For a complete discussion of these amendment.,seeu.s. congress, Senate
committee on Labor and HumanResource.,Davis—Bacon Act Amendments. 1983,
Senate hearing 98—337 (Washington, D.C.i U.S. Govirnment Printing Office,
1983).26
1979, 42 of the states had their own prevailing wage laws covering public
construction that telloutsidethejurisdiction of Davis—Bacon. Since 1979,
ninestates have repealed theirprevailing wage laws Alabama, Arizona,
Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, NewHampshire,andUtah.3'
Constructionlabor relations got someattention inthe 1992 presidential
campaign. In October 1992, President Bush issued twoexecutiveorder.
transparentlydesigned to woo support fromnonunion contractors. One
suspended the Davis-Bacon Act in three states that suffered damage from
Hurricane Andrew;theother barred contractors who enter into project
agreements with union. from bidding on federal contracts. The liftingof both
orders was one of President Clinton's first acts of of fice.m
VI •COLLECTIVEBJUtGAINING OUTCOMES
Wage developments in the industry since 1973 are exhibited in Figure 2.
The percentage increase in average hourly earnings for the entire industry
wavered mostly between 5 and 7 percent through 1962, well below the inflation
rate during that period. After 1982, wage growth was much slower, sticking
between 1 and 3 percent, again somewhat below inflation. Between 1980 and
1992, average hourly earnings increased from $9.92 to $14.05, a 42 percent
increase. At the same time the CPI—U increased by 70 percent, leading to a
drop in real wages by 17 percent.
Benefits accounted for 29 percent of compensation in construction in
1991, costing $5.23 per hour. Legally required benefits cost construction
employers $2.36 an hour, much more than the $1.40 average across all
industries. Legally required benefits cost much more in construction mainly
tFor details, see Thieblot (1966) and Northrup (1989).
r.aU5h lets cotractors in three states hire at below—union rates, lifl
StreetJournal, Oct. 15, 1992, p. A4 (Western edition); Clinton cancels Bush
orders about unions, Wall Street Journal, February 2, 1993, p. Al (Eastern
edition).21
becauseof the greater cost of workers compensation in such ahigh risk
industry with relatively many smallemployers.Between 1980 and1991,total
compensation perworker-—includingpayroll taxes and benefits —-grewby 58
percent, still below the rate of inflation.
Wageadjustments in collective bargaining agreements covering 1000
workers or more in the construction industry were greater than thegrowth in
wages for the industry as a whole through 1981, often much greater. In 1974
bargainingagreements called for increases above 10 percent, whereasaverage
wages grew 6 percent. Asimilar pattern is observed in 1980—81. Since 1982
it has been a completely different ballgasie. Unionwage adjustments have
tracked very closely with industry—wide wage growth for the last 10 years.tm
These raw data are unadjusted forchangesinworker or locational
characteristics. Table 4 showed that the union—nonunionwage gap has declined
substantially in the 1980s, implying larger increases in wages for open—shop
thanforunion workers.
Importantstepshave been taken in the 1980s to remove contract
provisionsthat make union labor noncompetitive.Construction Labor Research
Council (1992) found that the excess costs associated with constraints in
collective bargaining agreements had been reduced by 40 percent from 1980 to
1992.The main improvements have come from reducing wage premiums for
overtime and Saturday work and dropping provisions that call forpay when not
working.
Relationships between unionized contractors and the building trades seem
to have improved in the 1980sand 1990s. AsSection VII describes in some
detail, there have been a number of cooperative efforts between labor and
'Ths source of this information is U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
LaborStatistics, Emvlpvment Cost Indexes and Levels. 1975—91, BLS Bulletin
2389 (Washington, D.C., U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1991).
rhisinformation comes fromBLSBulletin 2389 and the October 1992 issue
of Monthly Labor Review.
DThe source of this information is various March issues ofComoensation
and Working Conditions, formerly Current WaceDevelonuents.28
management at the national level, including establishment ofcøeimjttees and
eliminationof burdensome work rules. There is indirectevidence at the local
levelin the form of a sharp reduction in work
stoppages. Historically, the
strike rate in construction has been higher than inmost other industries.
From 1968 through 1975, construction became muchmore strike—prone ——1
percent of estimated working timeinconstruction was lost to strikes in
contrast to 0.2 percent for all industries. Thi,no doubttedmany project
owners and builders to seek alternatives in theopen shop.
Since that time strikes have become lowprobabilityevents in the United
Statesand this is especially true in construction. Strikeactivity has
fallen along all major dimensions ——numberof strikes, worker, involved, days
idle, and percentage of working time lost. Thepercentage of working time
lost to strikes fell to 0.3 percent between 1976 and1981. Changes in the
format used by the Labor Department to report strikestatistics preclude
precisecomparisons for theindustry before and after 1982. Through 1983, the
strikerate remained higher, usually much higher, in constructionthan in all
industries. Since 1984 this no longer has been true——thestrike rate is now
lower in construction than for theeconomy as a whole. Given, the severe
decline in the aggregate strike rate in the 1980s, thisis a remarkable
turnaround.
VII. STRATEGIES FOR UNION BEcOVER
Torecover market share, unions are following three strategies.'4
First,their tactics for dealing with the open shop have becomemuch more
competitive. Thomas Owens, director of organizing for thebuilding trades,
has developed a data base to track all majorconstruction project, nationwide.
This lets unions know about work that is to be contractedin their area and
'4some of the following discussion is drawn from"Toning up union muscles,"fl, April 26, 1990, pp.36—40 and Business Roundtabje (1993).29
provides feedback aboutprogress incompeting againstthe open chop.
Another approach isto charge different wage rates for differenttypes
ofwork. In many parts of the country there has been alongstanding practice
of charging lower rates for residential construction. This hasbeen extended
to more types of work, including asbestos abatement.
Someunions have used a controversial, tactic known as jobtargeting.
Under this approach, the union gives acontractora rebate covering part or
all of the difference between union and open—shop rates so thecontractor can
land a particular project that otherwise would havegone to ths open shop.
This approach has proven popular in some locals because all memberspay into
the fund, thereby spreading the cost of the concession beyond thoseworking at
a particular job site.
In economic terms this practice is equivalent to price discrimination.
It allows a seller with market power (in this case the laborunion) to produce
more than it would if a single price were charged to all customers,thereby
makingboth parties better off. Even though price discrimination isa
standardpractice 11r businesses, job targeting has been challenged in court
by the Associated Builders and Contractors, a mostly nonunion tradegroup, on
the grounds that itisnothing more than a clever reincarnation of the
kickback schemes used by corrupt business agents since the turn of the
century. Metzgar (1988) points out that the subsidy "must be offered to
whichever contractor wins the bid, whether union or nonunion; the unioncannot
pick and choose a specific contractor." Also those union members who will be
affected by the subsidy must approve the practice. In 1989 theWage and Hour
Division of the Department of Labor ruled that job targeting violated the
Davis—Bacon Act and cannot be used to obtain federally funded projects. The
ABC has filed anantitrustcase challenging the legality of job targeting for
private sector work.
When Toyota started to build its plant in Georgetown, Kentucky, in 1986
and refused to sign a project agreement, the unions launched a corporate
campaign, described in Erlich (1968). The BCTD ordered all locals to refuse30
to work on the site, creating labor shortage in somecrafts.The Kentucky
Building Trades brought cases guestioning the legality of the taxconcessions
that secured theplant.There were also mass demonstrations in a numberof
cities.After sixmonths,Toyota signed a project agreement, recognizing the
costsof fighting the campaign. The same tactics are being followed to
organize the BMWplantbeing built in Spartanburg, South Carolina.r
Some locals have "salted" the workforces of open—shop contractors with
unionmembers to either organize the project or disrupt it.A recent practice
has been for union members to declare on job applications that they are union
organizers, so that if they are not hired they can file unfair labor practice
charges with the NLR3. The company rune the risk of expensive back—pay
assessmentsand penalties requiring preferential hiring onfuture projects if
it does not have defensible hiring procedures and criteria.
Thesecond strategy is labor—management cooperation. The unions have
recognized that they need to work with contractors toward the coanon goal of
building back market share. One step toward this was accomplished when the
National construction Employers Council signed an agreement with the BD to
set up a "Market Recovery Program for Union Construction," One objective of
this program was to develop "the collective bargaining program which ...will
assist in recapturing and maintaining the work for union construction, a
This involves developing guidelines at the national level for how local
contract provisions should be adjusted to make unions more competitive with
the open—shop. These include the standardization of work conditions across
different trades (especially those involving work scheduling), elimination of
inefficient work practices generated by either unions or management, reduction
of down time, and special agreements for small coonercial and industrial work.
A second objective of the program is to develop local labor—management
Zunions start BMW plant drive," ,April12, 1993, pp. 6—1.
SeeNorthrup (forthcoming) for a thorough discussion of this practice.
37Building and Construction Trades Department, ML—CXO, and National
Construction Employers Council (1984), p. 1.31
cormaittees.Hostofthe face—to—f aceinteractionbetween unions and
management traditionallyhas taken place in confrontational situations, mainly
grievancesand bargaining. A key purpose of the local connittees would be to
getthe groups together to focuson common goals. The committees would
monitor the size and growthofthe open—shop in their area, identity
inefficient work practices, work to improve the collective bargainingprocess
itself(e.g., contract duration, scope of bargaining UnitB), and engage in
public relations activities to win back project owners. The PRIDEprogramin
St. Louis, which was set up in 1972,has been cited repeatedly as being
successfulin preventing erosion of marketshare.However, there is no
systematic evidence on how these local efforts have worked out.
Anotherimportant steptoward co—operationtook place in 1987, when the
National Constructors Association and the 8CTD entered into the National
Construction Stabilization Agreement. The agreement established a benchmark
set of provisions to be used in project agreements. These provisions called
for greater flexibility in work scheduling and assignmentsand a no—strike
policy with financial penalties.S
The final strategy for dealing with the open shop challenge is
political.With Democrats controlling the White House andCongress, the odds
that there willbe labor law reforms favorable to the building trades have
risen.Increased spending on infrastructure should lead to a greater share of
jobsgoingto union members, thanks to prevailing wage laws. The unions
receivedan extra advantage in securing contracts for public sector work when
theSupreme Court ruled in 1993 that state and local authorities were free to
enter into union—only project agreements for publicly funded construction?
Thecase involved the $6.1 billion cleanup of Boston Harbor.
construction Industry Group, Labor Set Pact to Stem Job Losses to
Nonunion Crews," Wall Street Journal, February 1B, 1987.
Building and Construction Trades Council of the Metropolitan District v.
Aseocipted Builders and Contractors of Massachusetts/Rhode Island. Inc.. et
iL,61(J.S.L.W. 4221 (March 8, 1993}g unions Win Case Before Supreme Court
For Control of Public Building projects," Wall Street Journal, March 9, 1993.32
Two countiesand threecitiesin the SanFranciscobay area passed
prevailingwagelawsgoverning Drivate construction within thoselocalities.
Under theselaws, prevailingrates areto be set by the California Department
ofIndustrial Relations. These laws have been challenged in state and federal
courts. A federal judge struck them downin1991, ruling that they were
".impermissibleinterference in the collective bargainingprocess' under the
NLRAand also violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.m
According to the Business Roundtable (1993), some local unions have been
using the regulatory process to gain an edge on the open—shop. For instance,
union members can threaten to pack public permit hearings and voice (sometimes
less—than—sincere) environmental concerns that are likely to delay a project
as a tactic to win a union—only project agreement. They also can solicit
inspections of open—shop job sites by OSRA or the state board for craft
licensing. Given the very high rate of unionization among the public sector
workers who administer the regulatory apparatus, it is easy to understand
management's apprehension about these tactics.
Despite these competitive, cooperative, and political efforts, union
density is never likely to return to its 1970 level. The firms that have gone
open—shop or double—breasted are unlikely to return, even under the most
optimistic legislative scenarios, If there is to be a union comeback without
radical revisions in the nation's labor laws, the building trades must
capitalize on their stronget asset ——training.This is especially critical
now, given the lack of success the unions had organizing and training younger
workers in the 1980s. Because of technological change, the demand for skilled
labor is rising throughout the economy. This would give well—trained union
labor a competitive advantage as long as there is no return to the huge wage
increases and high strike rates of the late 1960s and 1970..
The sources of this information are L. Gordon Crovitz stretching the
Davis—Bacon,' Barren's, April 15, 1991, p. 14, and Private—Project Wage Laws Are Set Back," Wall Street Journal, June 26, 1991, p. 35 (Eastern edition).33
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Under 12 35.4 24.4
12 43.5 50.5
13—15 14.7 17.0
16 or more 6.4 8.0
Malor occupations
Executive, administrative, 11.6 8.0
and managerial
Professional specialty 1.8 2.5
Technicians and related support 0.7 1.1
Sales 0.4 0.9
Administrative support 6.4 6.5
Service and other 0.8 0.8
Precision production, craft, 52.0 55.1
and repair
Machine operators, assemblers, 1.7 1.7
and inspectors
Transportation and material moving 9.4 9.3
Handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers 15.1 14.1
and laborers
Selected crafts
Brickmaeons and stonemasons 2.5 2.2
Carpenters 16.7 13.3
Drywall installers 1.5 1.6
Electricians 4.1 5.5
Painters, construction and maintenance 5.6 4.0
Plumbers and pipefitters 4.6 4.1
Roofers 1.7 1.9
total, selected crafts 36.6 32.6
Source: CPS public use tapes.
-Table 2. Membership of unions in the Duilding and ConstructionTradesDept., AFL—CIO
Union 1979 Meabership (1000.)
1989 Change




Carpenters 619 613 —6 Electrical workers (IBEW) 825 744 —81 Elevator constructors 16 22
Engineers, operating 313 330
6















Tile, marble, terazzo 7 U U
Sum, excludingTeamsters 3235 2915 —320
teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousew.en, and Helper, of America affiliated on
November 1, 1987.
**Tile,Marble, Terrazzo, Finishers, Shopworkers, andGranite Cutter. InternationalUnion merged with United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
Americaon November10, 1988.
Source: Gifford (1990)Table 3. Percentage union membersandpercentage covered by collectIve






























































Sources: 1966—1981, Allen (1988); 1983—1992, Hirsch and Macpherson (1993).Table 4. Estimates of theunion—nonunion wage gap,1967—1992
Wachter, Year Allen & Carter Hirsch
1967 37.7






















Sources: Allen (1988a), Table 5, columns 2 and 3; Linneman,Wachter,and Carter






















a 1909, no Change withincohorts
Age
60 80
Figure 1. Percentage of construction workers in the private sector who are union










Figure 2. Percentage change in prices and construction wages, 1973-1991.
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